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Expanding State Constitutional Protections and the
New Silver Platter: After They've Shut the Door,
Can They Bar the Window?
The United States Supreme Court has declared that a death pen-
alty per se does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under
the eighth amendment.' State legislators have already begun to
rework former clauses to coincide with the one that passed Supreme
Court scrutiny.' When the Supreme Court speaks to an issue under
the Bill of Rights, the issue is generally considered to be ultimately
decided. Criminal defendants awaiting sentencing or on death row
can be expected to believe that the last word has finally been spo-
ken. This conclusion is not necessarily true. It is within the domain
of state court jurisprudence to extend individual protections further
than the Supreme Court sees fit. In 1972, for example, the Supreme
Court of California concluded that a penalty of death was unconsti-
tutional under state law.3 It took a state constitutional referendum
to override that decision, and, had that amendment not been
passed, the recent Supreme Court decision would have had little
effect in California.'
Should the Supreme Court decide to restrict prior decisions under
the fourth and fifth amendments, state courts would not be required
to follow these restrictive readings. Virtually every state constitu-
tion contains provisions similar in language and substance to the
federal Bill of Rights. This article examines how a state court can
rest its decision on the criminal safeguards in the state constitution
rather than upon the fourth and fifth amendments. Secondly, it
considers Illinois reaction to this option. Finally, the article investi-
gates the potential "silver platter" problem sure to arise in those
jurisdictions that rediscover their state constitutions and interpret
their protections more broadly for defendants.
1. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976). According to the U.S. CONST. amend. VIII,
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."
2. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1976, at 7, col. 4.
3. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
4. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (1972) provides in part:
The death penalty provided for under those statutes shall not be deemed to be,
or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual punishments within the meaning
of Article 1, Section 6 nor shall such punishment for such offenses be deemed to
contravene any other provision of this constitution.
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PERMISSIBILITY AND SCOPE OF BROADER PROTECTION UNDER STATE
CONSTITUTIONS
At the close of his opinion for the court in Cooper v. California,5
Justice Black indicated that a state may impose higher standards
on searches and seizures than the federal constitution requires
Many commentators have criticized the state courts' reluctance to
respond to this suggestion.7 Recently, however, a few state courts
have reconsidered their own constitutions in order to impose stricter
restraints on law enforcement officers and extend broader protection
to the defendant.'
If the state court can base its ruling on the state constitution, it
will effectively preclude Supreme Court review, because the Su-
preme Court will not review a decision resting on adequate state
grounds In Aikens v. California,0 for example, the Court dismissed
a grant of certiorari in a death penalty case from California because
the state court had in the interim declared the statute unconstitu-
tional under state law, thereby making further consideration unnec-
essary." Although a state court may expand the rights of the defen-
5. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
6. Id. at 62:
Our holding, of course, does not affect the State's power to impose higher standards
on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to
do so.
7. Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF.
L. REV. 273 (1973); Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights In A State Constitution, 1966 UTAH L.
REV. 326; Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4
VAND. L. REV. 620 (1951); Note, Rediscovering the California Declaration of Rights, 26
HASTINGS L. REV. 481 (1974); Note, Oregon Survey: Judicial Developments 1973, 53 ORE. L.
REV. 457, 490 (1974); Linde, Book Review, 52 ORE. L. REV. 325 (1973).
8. Hawaii, California, and Pennsylvania have all circumvented the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the fifth amendment which permits use of Miranda violations for impeach-
ment purposes, by interpreting similarly worded clauses in their respective state constitu-
tions. State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101,
545 F.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 341 A.2d 62 (Pa. 1975).
Hawaii and California have both circumvented Supreme Court interpretation of the fourth
amendment which permits a full custodial search after arrest for a minor traffic violation,
by using similarly worded clauses in their state constitutions. State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361,
520 P.2d 51 (1974); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 19 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975). Michigan has circumvented Supreme Court interpretation of the fourth amendment
which permits warrantless consensual electronic surveillance by basing its decision on
similar language in the state constitution. People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511
(1975).
9. For a discussion of what constitutes adequate state grounds, see Herb v. Pitcairn, 324
U.S. 117, 126-27 (1945). See also Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State
Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KENTUCKY L.J. 421 (1974); Wilkes, More On The New
Federalism In Criminal Procedure, 63 KENTUCKY L.J. 873 (1975).
10. 406 U.S. 813 (1972).
11. Id. at 814.
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dant through interpretation of the state's constitution, it must still
recognize the protections guaranteed by the federal constitution.
Should a state court fail to recognize these protections, its decision
remains subject to Supreme Court review."
While courts possess authority to broaden individual rights, they
risk reversal if the state grounds for their decisions are not clearly
expressed. 3 Ambiguity in the language of Cooper led some state
courts to believe that the state could interpret the Bill of Rights
more liberally for the defendant, placing greater restrictions on the
state than required by the Supreme Court. 4 The Oregon Supreme
Court reasoned in State v. Florance:15
If we choose we can continue to apply this interpretation. We
can do so by interpreting Article I, § 9, of the Oregon constitutional
12. 324 U.S. at 125-26:
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the principle that it will
not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent state
grounds (citations omitted). The reason is so obvious that it has rarely been thought
to warrant statement. It is found in the partitioning of power between the state and
federal judicial systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only
power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly
adjudge federal rights.
13. There can be quite an interplay between the state and federal supreme courts should
the United States Supreme Court decide to inquire where the state based its decision. A
frequently cited example is People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62
(1971). In Kriuda, the Supreme Court of California held that a police inspection of a person's
trash was subject to warrant and probable cause requirements, even where the search was
delayed until garbagemen had hauled the trash away. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, but during oral argument it developed that the California decision may
have rested on state as well as federal constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court remanded
the case to the California Supreme Court for clarification of the state's decision. California
v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972). The California court held that it was based on the state
constitution. People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973). The
United States Supreme Court therefore denied certiorari. California v. Krivda, cert. denied,
412 U.S. 919 (1973). See also Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974). More often than not the Supreme Court will decide for itself
whether the grounds are state or federal. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
14. Part of the difficulty may be attributable to general incomprehensibility in the entire
area. In People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972), the
California Supreme Court held that the state's death penalty was unconstitutional under the
state constitution, thus pre-dating what was then the definitive death penalty decision by
the Supreme Court. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In petitioning for certiorari, the
California attorney general asserted unsuccessfully that the federal question presented to the
United States Supreme Court was:
Whether the Supreme Court of California has incorrectly held that the death pen-
alty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment to the
federal constitution, notwithstanding that court's attempt to circumvent the juris-
diction of this Court over federal Constitutional questions by purporting to base its
difference on a minor difference in wording between otherwise identical federal and
state constitutional provisions.
Linde, Book Review, supra note 7, at 335.
15. 270 Or. 169, 527 P.2d 1202 (1974).
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prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures as being more
restrictive than the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution.
Or we can interpret the Fourth Amendment more restrictively
than interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.1"
The Supreme Court in Oregon v. Hass7 responded to this assertion,
and accepted the second sentence as good law but rejected the last
sentence since it "surely must be an inadvertent error."'"
Thus, the states may not demand greater restrictions as a matter
of federal constitutional law than the Supreme Court imposes.'9
State courts may nevertheless circumvent Supreme Court decisions
they consider insufficient to protect individuals, through provisions
in state constitutions similar to those in the Bill of Rights. So long
as the courts clearly rely on those constitutions without infringing
on federal rights, they will avoid Supreme Court review.
CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE: HAWAII AND CALIFORNIA
Five years after it decided Miranda v. Arizona,0 the Supreme
Court held in Harris v. New York2 that admissions obtained in
violation of Miranda are generally admissible against a defendant
for impeachment purposes. Several state courts have refused to fol-
low Harris and reassessed that question in terms of their state con-
stitutions.2
16. Id. at 182, 527 P.2d at 1208.
17. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
18. Id. at 719 n.4.
19. Id. at 719. The Court cites as authority for this statement two federal court of appeals
decisions. Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
981 (1966); Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 193 (8th Cir. 1965). Oregon is not
the only jurisdiction where courts are confused on how to protect their decisions. A lower New
York court, in People v. Kelly, 77 Misc. 2d 264, 353 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1974), after analyzing the
United States Supreme Court's approach to the fourth amendment and search incident to
an arrest for a minor traffic violation, noted that it conflicted with New York Court of Appeals
case law. Citing Cooper for the proposition that state courts may not narrow fourth amend-
ment protections more than the Supreme Court dictates, the court held that there was no
prohibition against the state extending such protection. This is clearly incorrect in light of
Oregon v. Hass. The lower court was reversed on other grounds in People v. Kelly, 79 Misc.
2d 534, 361 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1974).
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
22. See note 8 supra. Academic response to Harris has also been critical. See, e.g., Der-
showitz and Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic
of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971); Note, Admitting the Inadmissible
-The Wounding of Miranda, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 639 (1971); Note, The Impeachment Excep-
tion to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1476 (1973); Case Note, 40
FORDHAM L. REV. 394 (1971); Case Note, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1241 (1971); Note, Harris v.
New York: The Retreat from Miranda, 32 LA. L. REV. 650 (1972); Case Note, 24 VAND. L.
REV. 843 (1971).
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The Hawaii Supreme Court disavowed Harris in State v.
Santiago.23 While not contesting the prerogative of the United
States Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution authoritatively,
the Hawaii court proclaimed itself the final arbiter for interpreting
Hawaii's constitutional provisions." The court initially adopted the
principles of Miranda and held those notions had an independent
source in the Hawaii constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.I The court declared that in Hawaii, unless the
Miranda warnings" or their equivalent 7 are given to an accused, his
statements may not be used to impeach his credibility during rebut-
tal or cross-examination.28
The Supreme Court of California similarly repudiated the Harris
doctrine in People v. Disbrow .2  In overruling a decision that had
23. 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
24. Id. at 265, 492 P.2d at 664.
25. Id. Contrast the two constitutional provisions: HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 8: "... nor shall
any person be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST.
amend. V: "... nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
26. The four warnings set out in Miranda are that before custodial questioning, the defen-
dant must be apprised that he has a right to remain silent; anything he says can be used
against him as evidence; he has the right to an attorney; and if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him. 384 U.S. at 467-73.
27. Although no substitutes have been attempted to date, the Miranda Court left open
the possibility that the state could adequately protect criminal defendants without the for-
malism of the four warnings. 384 U.S. at 476.
28. 53 Haw. at 266, 492 P.2d at 664.
29. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976). It is also noteworthy that in
the interim between Santiago and Disbrow, two state courts attempted to refute Harris but
failed for procedural reasons. The Oregon court failed in State v. Hass, 267 Or. 489, 517 P.2d
671 (1973), by basing its judgment on both the Oregon and the federal constitutions. A
Michigan court, in People v. Mosley, 51 Mich. App. 105, 214 N.W.2d 564 (1974), simply
declined to follow Harris where police officers shifted defendant from officer to officer each
time he exercised his Miranda right to remain silent. The court held that Miranda could not
be circumvented in this manner. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96, 120 n.8 (1975), observed that
Although my Brother MmAsHALL correctly argued in Hass, 420 U.S., at 728 (dis-
senting), that we should have remanded for the state court to clarify whether it was
relying on state or federal law, such a disposition is not required here. In Hass the
state court cited both federal and state authority; in this case Mosley's counsel has
conceded that the self-incrimination argument in the state court was based solely
on the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
One state court that did not fail was Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Triplett, 341 A.2d
62, 64 (Pa. 1975):
Lastly, we must point out that our prohibition against the use of constitutionally
infirm statements to impeach the credibility of a criminal defendant testifying in
his own behalf is premised on the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 1, section 9,
P.S.
These examples should not be construed to imply that all states considering Harris have
acted with aversion. Chief Justice Jones of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, dissenting in
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followed the holding in Harris,3° the court criticized the Harris ra-
tionale as not what Miranda envisaged." The court proclaimed the
independent nature of the California constitution and reaffirmed its
responsibility to separately define and protect the rights of Califor-
nia citizens despite conflicting decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court interpreting the federal constitution.32
The Hawaii and California supreme courts have also renounced
the Supreme Court's holdings in United States v. Robinson 3 and
Gustafson v. Florida." Taken together, the cases permit a police
officer to conduct unrestricted searches of persons arrested for minor
traffic violations. The Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Kaluna31
was first in refuting this new liberalization of search and seizure
policy, and, as in Santiago, based its decision on the state constitu-
tion.36 The court recognized its obligation to follow Supreme Court
Commonwealth v. Triplett, points to over 30 states which have considered and accepted that
decision. 341 A.2d at 67.
30. People v. Nudd, 12 Cal. 3d 204, 524 P.2d 844, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1974). Both Disbrow
and Nudd were 4-3 decisions. The swing vote came from Chief Justice Wright, who could not
at the time of Nudd conceive that evidence obtained in such flagrant violation of Miranda
would ever be presented to the trier of fact. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 116, 545 P.2d
272, 282, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370 (1976).
31. 16 Cal. 3d at 112, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
32. Id. at 114-15, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69. Chief Justice Donald W.
Wright of the California Supreme Court answered critics who contended that the California
court had usurped Supreme Court authority when it declared the death penalty unconstitu-
tional under state law (see text accompanying notes 3 and 4 supra):
We also recognize that these people [the 104 California prisoners on death row]
were our responsibility. They had committed crimes in California, had been ad-
judged guilty in California, had been sentenced to death in California, were impris-
oned in California, and were to be executed in California under the laws of Califor-
nia. Our duty was to resolve the constitutional question, regardless of its difficulty
or magnitude . . . . We could not, in good conscience, avoid the problem by defer-
ring to any other court or any other branch of government.
Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to Anderson, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1262, 1273
(1972).
33. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
34. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
35. 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974).
36. Kaluna limited police to searching for weapons if the arrestee is believed to be armed,
and to seizing fruits and instrumentalities of the crime for which the suspect was arrested.
Id. The United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In contrast, the Hawaii constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy shall not be vio-
lated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
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pronouncements interpreting the federal constitution. After conced-
ing the reasonableness of the search under the Supreme Court's
reading of the fourth amendment, the court reiterated its role as the
state's ultimate judicial tribunal with final, unreviewable authority
to interpret and enforce the Hawaii constitution.37 In Oregon v. Hass
the Supreme Court cited Kaluna as an example of how a state can
legitimately increase protection for criminal defendants within its
jurisdiction .3
In People v. Brisendine,31 the Supreme Court of California like-
wise rejected Gustafson-Robinson. Justice Mosk, who later wrote
the majority opinion in Disbrow, held:
It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitu-
tions textually identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to
mirror their federal counterpart. The lesson of history is otherwise:
the Bill of Rights was based upon the corresponding provisions of
the first state constitutions, rather than the reverse. 0
ILLINOIS AND THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
Harris v. New York
The Illinois constitution also has provisions that resemble the
fourth and fifth amendments," but the Illinois Supreme Court has
not considered the route taken by the Hawaii and California
courts.'" Instead, it has conformed Illinois constitutional provisions
or things to be seized or the communications sought to be intercepted.
HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
37. 55 Haw. at 369, 520 P.2d at 58.
38. 420 U.S. at 719.
39. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975). Brisendine limits California
police to a pat-down search.
40. Id. at 550, 531 P.2d at 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
41. The Illinois counterpart to the fourth amendment reads:
The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or
interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. No
warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
The counterpart to the fifth amendment reads:
No person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself
nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
42. Justice Goldenhersh, dissenting from the majority's approval of Harris in People v.
Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211, 317 N.E.2d 545 (1974), suggested that Illinois could reject the Supreme
Court's decision:
Assuming, arguendo, that Harris permits the result reached here, this court is free
to impose higher standards for the protection of constitutional rights than those set
by the Supreme Court (citation omitted). This court has employed Harris as a
[Vol. 8
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to Supreme Court interpretations of the Bill of Rights. As a result,
Illinois decisions granting broader individual protections have be-
come dependent on Supreme Court treatment of those particular
issues .
Illinois judicial response to Harris is particularly noteworthy.
Prior to Miranda and Harris, the Supreme Court of Illinois reasoned
that, "fundamental justice will not countenance accomplishment,
by indirection, of that which it will not permit directly."44 Accord-
ingly, inadmissible confessions did not become competent evidence
when offered for impeachment.45 This view was echoed by the senti-
ment of the forthcoming Harris dissent which states that no consti-
tutional distinction should be drawn between use of incriminating
statements as direct proof of guilt and their use for impeachment.
The major objective in the exclusion of such evidence was to safe-
guard the integrity of the adversary system."
In People v. Luna, 7 the Illinois Supreme Court held that state-
ments made at a suppression hearing were not admissible for the
purpose of impeachment. The court distinguished Walder v. United
States," which was the current United States Supreme Court state-
ment on the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence for im-
peachment. Although Walder permitted use of the statements by
the prosecution, the evidence admitted pertained to collateral mat-
ters only. In Luna the inadmissible statements related directly to
vehicle to follow the Supreme Court into regression (citation omitted) but we need
not, as we do here, use it as the means to serve as its vanguard.
58 Ill.2d 211, 220, 317 N.E.2d 545, 550 (1974) (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting). The Justice did
not indicate whether he based his assertion on the state or federal constitution. If he believed
that the Illinois court could interpret the federal constitution more favorably for the defen-
dant than the Supreme Court, he was clearly mistaken.
43. James R. Thompson, who later became a United States Attorney, once lamented that
with Mapp v. Ohio the more liberal rules of Illinois in the search and seizure area would be
subjected to Supreme Court scrutiny. Thompson, Illinois Search and Seizure Law-The New
Frontier, 11 DE PAUL L. REv. 27, 41 (1961).
44. People v. Pelkola, 19 Il. 2d 156, 161-62, 166 N.E.2d 54, 58 (1960).
45. Id. at 162, 166 N.E.2d at 58. See also People v. Luna, 37 Ill. 2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586
(1967); People v. Hiller, 2 Ill. 2d 323, 118 N.E.2d 11 (1954); People v. Maggio, 324 Ill. 516,
155 N.E. 373 (1927); People v. Sweeney, 304 Ill. 502, 136 N.E. 687 (1922).
There appears to be no procedural distinction between an "admission" and a "confession."
An admission is an acknowledgment of facts tending to establish guilt, while a confession is
acknowledgment of participation in the crime. See Railsback, Self-Incrimination, 51 ILL. BAR
J. 278 (1962); Wexler, Pre-Trial Motions, 47 ILL. BAR J. 216, 226 (1958). A major source of
controversy had been whether the general rules on admissibility reached only confessions.
Dicta in People v. Lefler, 38 Ill. 2d 216, 220, 230 N.E.2d 827, 829 (1967), apparently resolved
the question by citing People v. Hiller, 2 Ill. 2d 323, 118 N.E.2d 11 (1954), for the proposition
that there should be no distinction between an incriminating statement and a confession.
46. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 231 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. 37 Il1. 2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586 (1967).
48. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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the guilt of the accused. The Illinois Supreme Court relied on this
distinction, refusing to admit the evidence for impeachment
purposes. 9 The same distinction was offered to the United States
Supreme Court in Harris, but the Court was not persuaded that
there was any difference in principle demanding a result contrary
to Walder. The Harris Court reasoned that the right of the defen-
dant to testify on his own behalf would not be construed as a license
to commit perjury. 50
Although the United States and Illinois Supreme Courts were at
odds, the Illinois court was not obligated to overrule Luna. Under
the self-incrimination clause of the Illinois constitution, the court
could have adhered to its prior case law without infringing on feder-
ally protected rights. Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court began to
backpedal,5' until it finally overruled Luna to the extent it con-
flicted with Harris.2 Thus, Illinois conformed its law to the Su-
preme Court's notions of individual rights.
Gustafson-Robinson
Put simply, Gustafson and Robinson permit identical custodial
arrest procedures whether a person is apprehended for a burglary or
for running a red light. As long as a suspect is placed under arrest,
the police officer is entitled to search the suspect and the area
within the suspect's immediate control.5 3 The Supreme Court of
Illinois has not dealt expressly with the eventualities made possible
by Gustafson and Robinson.4
In Illinois, following an arrest for a traffic violation, an officer is
entitled to search both the driver and the vehicle only if circumstan-
ces reasonably indicate that he is not dealing with an ordinary
traffic offender.5 This contrasts with the Supreme Court procedure,
49. 37 Ill. 2d at 307-08, 226 N.E.2d at 590.
50. 401 U.S. at 226.
51. People v. Byers, 50 Ill. 2d 210, 278 N.E.2d 65 (1972); People v. Moore, 54 Ill. 2d 33,
294 N.E.2d 297, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973).
52. People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211, 216, 317 N.E.2d 545, 548 (1974).
53. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
54. In People v. Palmer, 62 Ill. 2d 261, 342 N.E.2d 353 (1976), the defendant was stopped
for failure to have a license plate. When he could not furnish a driver's license the police
conducted a pat-down search and discovered a weapon. In upholding the conviction, the
Illinois court relied on prior Illinois cases holding that the absence of license plates suggests
a serious violation of the law. People v. Brown, 38 Ill. 2d 353, 231 N.E.2d 577 (1967); People
v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960); People v. Berry, 17 Ill. 2d 247, 161 N.E.2d
315 (1959). The court ignored Gustafson-Robinson. See Alwin, Searches During Routine
Traffic Stops after Robinson and Gustafson, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 853 (1976).
55. People v. Tate, 38 Ill. 2d 184, 230 N.E.2d 697 (1967); People v. Davis, 33 11. 2d 134,
210 N.E.2d 530 (1965); People v. Thomas, 31 Ill. 2d 212, 201 N.E.2d 413 (1964).
[Vol. 8
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which requires only a probable cause arrest as a prelude to a thor-
ough search.
In the area of search and seizure, the comparable Illinois constitu-
tional provisions could be used to maintain the court's independent
policy without risking Supreme Court scrutiny of supposedly fourth
amendment violations. However, in the past, Illinois courts have
chosen to ignore this alternative and have repeatedly conformed
their automobile search decisions to those of the Supreme Court. 6
In People v. Cannon,57 the Illinois appellate court noted this ac-
quiescence, and anticipated supreme court acceptance of
Gustafson-Robinson. The court saw little use in applying prior Illi-
nois standards and turned to Gustafson-Robinson for guidance.
While the Illinois Supreme Court has yet to sanction the Gustafson-
Robinson rule, it is instructive when an appellate court behaves as
though that approval is a mere formality."
STATE SUBSERVIENCE TO SUPREME COURT AUTHORITY
By basing its decision on the state constitution, a state court does
more than simply circumvent Supreme Court review. It reasserts its
role for the ultimate responsibility in the criminal law decisions
within its jurisdiction. The state court also establishes a separate
body of state law upon which to build future decisions. Yet, along
with Illinois, the overwhelming majority of states defer to the
56. In People v. Lewis, 34 Ill. 2d 211, 215 N.E.2d 283 (1966), the Illinois Supreme Court
based a decision to suppress evidence obtained from searching a car trunk on Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). Preston had held it unreasonable to search the trunk of a
car taken into custody. The United States Supreme Court subsequently decided Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), which upheld the warrantless search of an automobile im-
pounded as evidence. The Illinois court took this as a clarification of the standards in Preston,
and in People v. Brown, 38 111. 2d 353, 231 N.E.2d 577 (1967), upheld the search of a car trunk
after a traffic arrest. Lewis was explicitly overruled in People v. Jones, 38 Ill. 2d 427, 231
N.E.2d 580 (1967).
57. 18 Ill. App. 3d 781, 310 N.E.2d 673 (1974).
58. In contrast, a lower New York court in People v. Kelly, 77 Misc. 2d 264, 353 N.Y.S.2d
111 (1974) chose to follow prior New York law because the New York Court of Appeals had
yet to consider Gustafson-Robinson. The Kelly court cited the latest New York Court of
Appeals decision, People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967).
The court held that although the New York Court of Appeals could not narrow fourth amend-
ment protections, there was no prohibition against its extending such protection (see note 19
supra for criticism of the procedural difficulty inherent in this contention). The court con-
cluded that Marsh was not replaced by Gus tafson-Robinson and was still the law in New
York. 77 Misc. 2d at 269, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
Kelly was reversed on other grounds in People v. Kelly, 79 Misc. 2d 534, 361 N.Y.S.2d 135
(1974). The New York court deferred to the authority of Marsh, which prohibited a full search
by the police after a motorist had been arrested for a traffic violation, but determined that
Marsh was not controlling, since the defendant had been lawfully arrested for the commission
of a felony. Id. at 536, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
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United States Supreme Court even when such deference is unneces-
sary. Since scholars have by and large neglected the field of state
constitutional law,"9 one can only speculate why more states have
not chosen the recent path of Hawaii and California.
It appears that most individual rights provisions already existed
in state laws prior to their embodiment in the federal constitution.'"
The early state legislatures conditioned acceptance of this
Constitution upon submission and ratification of the protections
later known as the Bill of Rights.' This Bill of Rights was sculptured
from existing state provisions guaranteeing individual freedoms.
Thus, the drafters of the first Illinois constitution had not only the
federal constitution as a model, but state constitutions from the
revolutionary period as well.62 In fact, the individual rights provi-
sions of the Illinois Constitution of 1818 more closely resemble lan-
guage of early state constitutions than language of the Bill of
Rights.6 3 However, in 1932, the Illinois Supreme Court asserted that
59. Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, supra note 7, at 327-28.
60. B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1971); Case Note, 1953
U. ILL. L.F. 471, 472.
Delaware, in its Declaration of Rights (1776), provided that "no Man in the Courts of
common Law ought to be compelled to give Evidence against himself." 2 SOURCES AND Docu-
MENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 198 (W. Swindler, ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Swindler].
The amendments were proposed by Congress on September 25, 1789, and ratified by three-
fourths of the state legislatures by December 15, 1791. NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION COMMITTEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES AND UNITED STATES 8 n.4 (1938). Most
of the original 13 colonies had adopted constitutions with individual rights provisions by 1776.
See generally AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIC LAWS 1492-1908 (F. Thorpe,
ed. 1909).
61. G. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 5 (1969).
62. J. CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS, 1818-1970, at 11 (1972). See also Falk,
The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273,
283 (1973).
63. ILL. CONST. (1818) art. VIII, § 7:
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an
officer may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of the fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offences are not
particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and
ought not to be granted.
See 3 Swindler, supra note 60, at 244. Compare PA. CONST. (1776), art. X:
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and posses-
sions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants without oaths or affirma-
tions first made, affording a sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any officer
or messenger may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize
any person or persons, his or their property, not particularly described, are contrary
to that right, and ought not to be granted.
5 AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIC LAWS 1492-1908, at 3083 (F. Thorpe,
ed. 1909).
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the fourth amendment was the "prototype" for the state search and
seizure law, and therefore should not receive a different interpreta-
tion. 4 The court was ignoring state constitutional history.
Perhaps the first submission by the Illinois court to United States
Supreme Court interpretation came with the adoption of the
exclusionary rule in 1924.5 The Illinois Supreme Court apparently
grounded its decision on both the search and seizure clause of the
Illinois constitution and Supreme Court interpretation of the fourth
amendment. While creating and expanding this reliance on federal
constitutional pronouncements, the court has failed to offer a satis-
factory justification for this parallelism. The Illinois Supreme Court
has noted the similarity between the fourth amendment and the
Illinois search and seizure clause and between the fifth amendment
and the Illinois self-incrimination clause." In People v. Grod,67 the
Illinois court, reviewing prior Illinois and Supreme Court opinions
in the search and seizure area, determined that the provisions were
in effect the same and would be construed alike by the Illinois
courts. In People v. Jackson,"5 the court stated unmistakably that
it would follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
on identical state and federal criminal problems. 9 In People v.
Cannon, this philosophy reinforced the appellate court's anticipa-
tion of eventual acceptance by the Illinois Supreme Court of the
Gustafson-Robinson approach.
In attempting to distinguish the federal and Illinois constitutions,
a defendant might stress the semantic dissimilarities between the
documents. The California Supreme Court in People v. Anderson"
emphasized the distinction between "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" (eighth amendment) and "cruel or unusual punishment"
(California constitution). In declaring the death penalty unconstitu-
tional under state law, the court reasoned that the use of the dis-
junctive was purposeful, in that it indicated the framers' desire to
prohibit the imposition of a punishment that, by contemporary
standards, was either cruel or unusual.7 However, the Illinois appel-
64. People v. Reynolds, 350 I1. 11, 16, 182 N.E. 754, 756 (1932).
65. People v. Castree, 311 Il. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924).
66. People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 53 N.E.2d 591 (1944); accord, People v. Tillman, 1111. 2d
525, 116 N.E.2d 344 (1954). Justice Klingbiel, dissenting in Tillman, a search and seizure
case, asserted that the decision made a mockery of the Illinois constitution. Id. at 533, 116
N.E.2d at 349.
67. 385 I1. 584, 53 N.E.2d 591 (1944).
68. 22 Ill. 2d 382, 176 N.E.2d 803 (1961).
69. Id. at 387, 176 N.E.2d at 805.
70. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
71. Id. at 634, 493 P.2d at 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
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late court in People v. Henne72 dispelled notions that such distinc-
tions may be valid in Illinois. The defendant there attempted to
distinguish the wording of article 1, section 10, of the Illinois consti-
tution from the language of the fifth amendment. The Illinois con-
stitution protects an individual from being compelled "to give evi-
dence against himself,"73 whereas the fifth amendment protects him
from being compelled "to be a witness against himself."74 The de-
fendant argued that the word "give" made the Illinois constitution
more restrictive. Characterizing this argument as an exercise in
semantics,75 the court based its rejection on People ex rel. Hanrahan
v. Power7" which stated: "The two provisions differ in semantics
rather than in substance and have received the same general con-
struction."7
In Halpin v. Scotti,5 the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the
fifth amendment and its Illinois counterpart "may" be construed
alike.79 This could indicate that the Illinois court has recognized its
option to distinguish state constitutional provisions from Supreme
Court determinations of federal constitutional protection. Despite
apparent recognition of this alternative, Illinois has continually de-
ferred to Supreme Court criminal procedure guidelines. Overriding
policy considerations may be the reason for this deference.
It has been argued that the Supreme Court's unique position in
the judicial structure makes it better able to interpret individual
rights provisions objectively. For instance, Justice Schaefer of the
Illinois Supreme Court observed that the United States Supreme
Court is more removed from the pressure on local judges in criminal
cases:
The more remote the court the easier it is to consider the case in
terms of a hypothetical defendant accused of crime, instead of a
particular man whose guilt has been established 0
The import from this concept is that the Supreme Court may be in
the best position to protect the criminal defendant. As one writer
has noted, the state courts have acted more as a brake than an
accelerator in the domain of civil liberties." It is difficult to find a
72. 11 Ill. App. 3d 405, 296 N.E.2d 769 (1973).
73. For full provision see note 41 supra.
74. See note 25 supra.
75. 11 Ill. App. 3d at 406, 296 N.E.2d at 770.
76. 54 Ill. 2d. 154, 295 N.E.2d 472 (1973).
77. Id. at 160, 295 N.E.2d at 475.
78. 415 Ill. 104, 112 N.E.2d 91 (1953).
79. Id. at 107, 112 N.E.2d at 93.
80. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1956).
81. Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, supra note 7, at 348.
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state court decision prior to Gideon v. Wainwright" which holds
that counsel for the indigent was constitutionally required, or a
state court prior to Weeks v. United States3 which adopted an
exclusionary rule.8 '
If there is any reason behind Illinois' amenability to Supreme
Court precedent, perhaps it stems from a desire to maintain con-
formity between the sovereigns. Conformity also seems to be the
rationale guiding the dissents in those jurisdictions which have
elected to evade Supreme Court review by basing their decisions on
state constitutions. Justice Burke, dissenting in People v.
Brisendine," urged that Supreme Court interpretations of the fed-
eral constitution should be strongly persuasive as to what interpre-
tations are placed upon similarly worded state constitutional provi-
sions. 6 Justice Richardson, dissenting in People v. Disbrow,8" as-
serted that in the absence of countervailing circumstances, state
courts should defer to Supreme Court interpretations of nearly
identical constitutional language rather than attempt to create a
separate echelon of state constitutional interpretations. This reli-
ance on conformity was believed to be necessary to promote "uni-
formity and harmony in an area of the law which peculiarly and
uniquely requires them.""
For most state courts to be so concerned with conformity seems
ironic in view of the fact that most state constitutions were adopted
long before the Bill of Rights was considered applicable to the
states." Before the Warren Court began to incorporate selectively
from the first eight amendments, the state constitution was the
individual's major, if not sole, source of protection. The present
acquiescence to federal interpretations could well be state court
reaction to the gradual retreat from the broader protections de-
82. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
83. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
84. Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, supra note 7, at 346.
85. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975). See notes 29-32 supra and
accompanying text.
86. 13 Cal. 3d at 555, 531 P.2d at 1117, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (Burke, J., dissenting).
87. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976). See notes 39 and 40 supra and
accompanying text.
88. 16 Cal. 3d at 119, 545 P.2d at 284, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 372 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
89. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833); Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-
American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 80, 100 (1969):
It seems ironic, but except for due process, judge-made law or the common law
whose beauty was its flexibility and capacity to grow and adapt to changing times
through court decisions, was both before and after the passage of the fourteenth
amendment the exclusive domain of state courts and not federal judges. The United
States Supreme Court is not a common law court. There is no common law consti-
tution.
See also Linde, Book Review, supra note 7.
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manded by the Warren Court.9 0 State courts, once forced to enlarge
procedural safeguards for criminal defendants, may now take com-
fort in more conservative Supreme Court decisions. These decisions
may more closely mirror what most state courts had thought all
along.
SILVER PLATTER SPECTER
Once a state court takes advantage of its option and indepen-
dently extends individual rights, one evidentiary problem sure to
arise will be whether evidence obtained in violation of the state's
constitution will be admissible in a federal trial. Problems raised by
Gustafson-Robinson situations are perhaps simplest to conceptual-
ize. For example, if a California policeman oversteps the permissible
scope for state searches after traffic arrests, yet manages to remain
within the boundaries set by the United States Supreme Court,
what will happen if he turns his evidence over to the federal court
sitting in that state?
Those jurisdictions rejecting Supreme Court interpretation of
similarly worded state constitutional provisions will find themselves
with a form of "silver platter" problem comparable in some respects
to the one that burdened the federal courts prior to Elkins v. United
States." The exclusionary rule, adopted by the federal courts in
1914,92 applied to acts by federal law enforcement agencies. For a
time this rule was effectively avoided whenever a state rather than
a federal officer obtained the evidence illegally. Permitting such
evidence to be admitted in a federal prosecution caused Justice
Frankfurter to remark that the federal government was handed the
evidence on a "silver platter. 9 3 For 50 years the Court grappled with
this inequity94 until the Court in Elkins ruled that evidence seized
by either state or federal officials in violation of the federal constitu-
tion was inadmissible in a federal trial.9 5
90. For a thorough comparison between the Warren Court and Burger Court decisions in
the criminal procedure field, see Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State
Court Evasion of the Burger Court, supra note 9, at 423-24 (1974). See also Wilkes, More On
The New Federalism In Criminal Procedure, supra note 9. In the articles the author explores
in detail the adequate state grounds doctrine and the state courts that have recently relied
on it to evade restrictive decisions by the Burger Court.
91. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
92. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
93. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949).
94. Usually the federal court would endeavor to find some federal participation in the
illegal action. See, e.g., Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) (state officials illegally
seized liquor where the only offense was a federal one; the evidence was excluded); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (joint cooperation between federal and state officers made
illegally seized evidence inadmissible in federal trial).
95. 364 U.S. at 223.
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Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Elkins, maintained that the
decision would disturb federal-state relations by encouraging state
illegalities. Justice Frankfurter contended that in a state that al-
ready recognized its own form of exclusionary rule, a state officer
disobeying a state law need only turn his evidence over to federal
prosecutors to evade the disciplinary policies of the state." The
Elkins decision created two classes of illegally seized evidence: con-
stitutionally inadmissible evidence, and evidence obtained illegally
under state law. Once Mapp v. Ohio"5 made the exclusionary rule
binding on the states, the first class of illegal evidence was not
admissible anywhere. However, as to the second category, the prob-
lem raised by Justice Frankfurter will reoccur in states which ex-
clude more than is federally required.
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court, commenting
upon Mapp, recognized that local rules and federal rules were not
always symmetrical. To replace the local ones mechanically would
needlessly impair federal-state relations.9 He assumed that any vio-
lations of state rules would invoke constitutional sanctions since
whatever was illegal under state law was necessarily unreasonable
under federal standards. He urged the federal courts to look directly
to state decisions for guidance.' 0
The federal courts will apply the state substantive law to civil
proceedings in federal courts when required by diversity of citizen-
ship. '° This partial conformity to state law naturally results in a
lack of uniformity among decisions in federal district courts. This
is tolerated because citizens of different states need assurance that
the state laws will be neutrally applied. However, all federal crimes
are statutory and based on congressional acts. Unlike civil proceed-
ings, where the conformity must run between the forum state and
the federal court presiding therein, in criminal prosecutions the
conformity must run between the federal district courts. 0 2
It has long been the policy of the Supreme Court that federal law
96. Id. at 245-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 246 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
98. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
99. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319 [hereinafter
cited as Traynor].
100. Id. at 328. Reverse silver platter, whereby evidence seized in violation of the federal
constitution was admitted in a state trial, was dealt with differently depending on the
jurisdiction. In Illinois, for instance, prior to Mapp evidence obtained by persons other than
state officers acting under color of authority of the state was not subject to the Illinois
exclusionary rule. See, e.g., People v. Touhy, 361 11. 332, 347, 197 N.E. 849, 857 (1935).
101. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
102. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26, Advisory Committee Comment.
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governs admissibility of evidence in a federal trial.' 3 In doing so
federal courts have unanimously rejected Justice Traynor's posi-
tion.' 4 Neither the statutes nor decisional law of the forum state
control admissibility of evidence in any phase of a federal criminal
trial. This policy was codified in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which had stated that common law principles
as interpreted by federal courts governed admissibility of evidence
in federal trials.'"5 Although Rule 26 was amended in 197206 in antic-
ipation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, this policy remains.' 7
One deviation from that policy apparently occurred in the 1948
decision of United States v. Di Re,"'s which held that where an arrest
without warrant took place, the law of the state would govern in the
absence of an applicable federal statute. The Court saw no reason
why state law would not be an appropriate standard to test warrant-
less arrests.'09 Any authority to be gleaned from Di Re, however, has
been undermined by Elkins:
In determining whether there has been an unreasonable search and
seizure by state officers, a federal court must make an independent
inquiry, whether or not there has been such an inquiry by a state
court, and irrespective of how any such inquiry may have turned
103. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933), and Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7
(1934), indicate that in the absence of a statute the federal courts in criminal cases are not
bound by state laws of evidence but by common law principles as interpreted by the federal
courts. It was on this principle that Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, infra
note 105, was based. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26, Advisory Committee Comment.
104. United States v. Turner, 497 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Miller, 452
F.2d 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972); United States v. Sims, 450 F.2d 261
(4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 933 (1971); Ramer v. United States, 411 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 965
(1969); United States v. Jones, 369 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Montgomery,
126 F.2d 151 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 681 (1942). In Burge v. Estelle, 496 F.2d 1177,
1178 (5th Cir. 1974), the court addressed itself directly to Justice Traynor's remarks and
rejected them.
105. The former Rule 26 provided:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by an act of Congress or by these rules. The admissibility of
evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except
when an Act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience.
FED. R. CaM. P. 26 (1970).
106. Rule 26 was amended in 1972 to read:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by these rules, the Federal Rules of
Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.
FED. R. CrIM. P. 26 (1972).
107. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26, Advisory Committee Comment.
108. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
109. Id. at 589-90.
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out. The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what one
state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by what an-
other may have colorably suppressed."'
Thus, the Supreme Court in its supervisory role has the ultimate
task of defining the scope to be accorded the various common law
evidentiary privileges in federal criminal trials."' Instructively, in
both Elkins and its companion case, Rios v. United States,"2 the
evidence was seized by state officers without federal participation
and was suppressed by a state tribunal under state law. This did
not deter the Court from remanding for a separate federal determi-
nation of the state officers' conduct.13
In Smayda v. United States,"4 the ninth circuit confronted a case
under the Assimilated Crimes Act"' in which the laws of California
110. 364 U.S. at 223-24.
111. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309 (1967). One article, addressing itself
to Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Elkins, felt that the difficulty in differentiating that which
is constitutionally infirm from that which is merely illegal was no less than the pre-Elkins
difficulty in determining whether there was any federal participation:
Why the constant conflict between the policy of exclusionary rule states and federal
silver-platterism should be preferred by the dissenting justices to an occasional
frustration of a state's efforts under the Elkins rule is difficult to understand.
Berman & Oberst, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by an Unconstitutional Search and
Seizure-Federal Problems, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 525, 546 (1960).
112. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
113. In Elkins the state officers procured a search warrant upon information and belief
that petitioner possessed obscene motion pictures. The search uncovered no obscene matter,
but various other incriminating evidence was discovered. The county district court held the
search warrant invalid and ordered suppression of the evidence. Since the action came after
the return of an indictment by a state grand jury, the local district attorney challenged the
power of the court to order suppression. When the motion to suppress was argued anew in
the circuit court, the evidence was again deemed unlawfully procured and it was ordered
suppressed. The state indictment was subsequently dismissed. While this was going on,
federal officers acting under a federal search warrant obtained the incriminating matter from
a safe deposit box where it was being kept by state officials. Shortly after the state case was
dismissed, the federal prosecution began. 364 U.S. at 207 n.1.
In Rios the state officials were following a taxicab that petitioner had entered. When the
cab stopped for a red light, the officers approached and identified themselves as policemen.
A quick succession of events occurred during which Rios allegedly dropped narcotics to the
floor. California, at the time an exclusionary rule state, granted petitioner's motion to supress
the evidence and entered a judgment of acquittal. Thereafter, one of the officers who arrested
Rios discussed the case with a supervisor and they decided to turn the evidence over to federal
narcotics officials. 364 U.S. at 255-59.
114. 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970):
Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or
acquired as provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty of any act or omission which,
although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable
if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession,
or District in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time
of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like
punishment.
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applied. The court conceded that the evidence used to convict the
defendant would have been inadmissible in the California courts."'
Nevertheless, it concluded that the question of admissibility in a
federal trial was a federal question. The United States Constitution,
not that of California, determines the admissibility of evidence.
Decisions of the California Supreme Court are not binding on the
federal court's interpretation of the Constitution.
A state court's decision granting broader rights to criminal defen-
dants will probably be of no help to that defendant in federal court.
The federal constitution protects the individual in federal court;
Supreme Court interpretations of that Constitution control what
evidence will be admissible. A federal court need not look to the
state bill of rights when similar rights are present in the federal
constitution. The federal courts exist to uphold federal law and
recognition of state law is alien to that purpose."' In the absence of
an abrupt change in federal policy, state courts that broaden crimi-
nal rights will have to uncover alternate ways to combat the "silver
platter" problem." 9
The defendant in Smayda was indicted for oral copulation in Yosemite National Park.
116. Defendant could not be convicted in California because the type of surveillance used
had been found illegal under the California constitution in similar cases. See Britt v. Superior
Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962); Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57
Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962).
117. 352 F.2d at 253.
118. In United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that
evidence seized by state officials and subsequently suppressed in a state criminal proceeding,
was admissible in a federal civil tax action. Janis did not directly confront the "silver plat-
ter" problem for several reasons. First, the state court had ruled the evidence unconstitu-
tional under the fourth amendment rather than under state law. Id. at 3024. Second, the
Court dismissed the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule as minimal in this case since
the evidence was admissible in neither a state nor federal criminal proceeding. As a result,
the criminal enforcement process, which was the sole concern of the arresting officers, was
frustrated. Id. at 3029. However, this rationale would naturally be diluted in cases where the
evidence is admissible in a federal criminal trial.
119. Chief Justice Taney is often mentioned for his views on the separation of state and
federal power. Chief Justice Taft in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928),
reaffirmed Chief Justice Taney's opinion in United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361,
363 (1851), which asserted that the 34th Section of the Judiciary Act did not give the states
power to prescribe evidence in a federal trial: "For this construction would in effect place the
criminal jurisprudence of one sovereignty under the control of another." Taney was later cited
by Justice Frankfurter in Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490-91 (1944), for his
opinion in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858):
[T]he powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both exist
and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct
sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their re-
spective spheres. And the sphere of action appropriated to the United States is as
far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court,
as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the
eye.
Reverse Silver Platter
FEASIBILITY OF AN INJUNCTION
One possible way for a state to prevent evidence seized illegally
under state law from being admitted in a federal prosecution might
be through the use of an injunction. In Rea v. United States,2 "
decided before the exclusionary rule was applied to the states, the
Supreme Court granted an injunction against a federal agent to
prevent him from testifying or turning over unconstitutionally
seized evidence to a state prosecutor. A federal district court ruled
that the federal agent had seized the evidence under an invalid
search warrant. Thereafter, the agent swore out a complaint for
petitioner's arrest before a state court judge, who charged petitioner
with possession of marijuana in violation of state law. 2' The defen-
dant requested the federal court to enjoin the federal narcotics agent
from testifying in state court, and to compel the destruction of the
illegally seized evidence. The district court refused to grant the
injunction and the court of appeals affirmed.'22 The Supreme Court
reversed.
In a brief opinion by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court held
that the federal agent had violated the federal rules governing
search and seizure, and asserted the Court's authority to command
observance of these rules.'2 3 No injunction was sought against a state
official. Therefore, the Court reasoned that to prevent federal agents
from testifying or using fruits of illegal searches in state courts, was
merely to enforce the federal rules against those required to observe
them." 4
Rea has since been confined very closely to its facts.' 5 Commen-
tary at the time Rea was decided often considered it just another
harbinger anticipating the eventual application of the exclusionary
rule to the states.' Today, Rea stands for the proposition that, once
120. 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
121. Id. at 215.
122. Rea v. United States, 218 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.), rev'd, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
123. 350 U.S. at 217.
124. Id.
125. Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961). This
is not meant to imply that Rea should be dismissed perfunctorily. In United States v. Na-
varro, 441 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1971), a federal court refused to let a federal agent testify in a
state prosecution concerning evidence obtained in violation of federal rules, and based its
decision on Rea's authority.
126. Case Note, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 157 (1956); Case Note, 44 ILL. BAR J. 639 (1956); Case
Note, 41 IOWA L. REV. 709 (1956); Case Note, 5 UTAH L. REV. 115 (1956). Articles critical of
Rea include Case Note, 8 ALA. L. REV. 391 (1956) (questioning the right of the Court to enjoin
a federal agent in the absence of statute); Case Note, 58 W. VA. L. REV. 412 (1956) (question-
ing judicial control over an employee of the Department of the Treasury); Case Note, 70 HARV.
L. REv. 145 (1956).
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a federal court has ruled the evidence unconstitutionally seized, it
can enjoin federal officials from turning it over to the state prosecu-
tor.
If a federal court can enjoin federal agents from turning over or
testifying as to the fruits of illegal searches, can a state court em-
ploying its own supervisory power enjoin state officers from deliver-
ing evidence to a federal prosecutor?'1 Obviously, the state could
not impede a federal prosecution. An injunction of this sort reaches
a state official, a person owing allegiance to state law. Such an
injunction would not interfere with the federal court per se, but to
a limited extent would allow the state court to give its state consti-
tutional decisions broader effect.'28
A Florida court considered granting such an injunction in 1955,
but decided not to do S0.129 The court believed it was necessary for
injunctive relief to find "unusual circumstances" or the "strong
showing of irreparable loss or damage to complainant's property or
other rights.' ' 30 It found neither.' 3' Although the evidence had been
declared illegally seized under Florida law, the court would not
enjoin the offending officer from turning it over to federal authori-
ties. 131
In theory, it appears that a state court would have the power to
restrain its law enforcement officials from flouting state policy.' 3
The issue has yet to be litigated. A formidable hindrance to this
approach would be the supremacy clause of the Constitution.' 34 If
127. Note, Federal Policy Regarding Evidence Illegally Seized, 16 MD. L. REV. 240
(1956); Case Note, 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 345 (1956); Case Note, 7 SYRACUSE L. REV. 319, 320
(1956).
128. One criterion already certain is that the state first would have to judicially declare
the evidence inadmissible under its own laws. In Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961),
Rea was distinguished when petitioner was arrested for narcotics by federal agents and deliv-
ered to state authorities. A motion to suppress was denied in the state court. Petitioner
brought an action in federal court to enjoin introduction of the narcotics. Justice Whittaker
exclaimed:
How different are the facts in the present case! Here there is no allegation or
showing that any proceedings ever were taken against petitioner under any federal
rule or in any federal court.
365 U.S. at 386-87.
129. Weiner v. Kelly, 82 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1955). In Weiner the Dade County Sheriff
procured a search warrant to seize contraband. The state filed criminal charges and defen-
dant successfully quashed the warrant. The case was nolle prosequi. Subsequently the United
States District Attorney filed an information against the defendant. Defendant filed a com-
plaint in the Circuit Court of Dade County to enjoin the state officers from testifying in
federal court and from turning over the evidence.
130. 82 So. 2d at 157.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See generally 42 AM. Jua. 2d Injunctions § 183 (1969).
134. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
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a state court did enjoin a state agent from testifying and a federal
court issued an order compelling him to testify, under the suprem-
acy clause the federal court would undoubtedly prevail. 35
As early as 1867 the Supreme Court was asserting federal suprem-
acy whenever the two powers collided. 8 Judging from Donovan v.
City of Dallas,3 7 a civil case, any prospect of a federal court's honor-
ing a state injunction must remain remote. There, the state court
issued an injunction to prevent plaintiffs from bringing their suit to
federal court. The Supreme Court held that once a federal court has
jurisdiction and the plaintiff has a right to prosecute, a state injunc-
tion can have no effect on a federal court.'38 It may likewise be found
that the breaking of a federal law establishes federal jurisdiction. A
state court injunction could not be used to hamper the separate
federal use of the evidence. Because Rea permits the federal courts
to issue such an injunction to federal officers, it nevertheless ap-
pears inequitable to prevent the state courts from exercising similar
authority.
Should a reciprocal Rea approach be recognized, it only offers a
severely limited remedy. The state court must declare the evidence
inadmissible before the state officials try to divert it to federal
court.' 39 This would not help a defendant where the state police
violating the state law immediately turned the evidence over to the
federal prosecutor, or where the state prosecutor turned the evi-
dence over to the federal authorities before bringing an action in the
state court.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
135. Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire In Search And Seizure And Self Incrimination, 42
CORNELL L.Q. 346 (1957). Judson Parsons suggests that the federal interest in refusing to
honor the injunction would be to assure that the truth be made known to the federal courts.
But if restraining federal officers from unconstitutional activity is important
enough to cause federal courts to keep out relevant evidence, surely state efforts to
control state officers are important enough in the federal scheme of things to merit
similar treatment.
Id. at 363.
136. Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 195 (1867).
137. 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
138. Id. at 412-13. The only exception would be where the court has custody of the
property; that is, proceedings in rem or quasi in rem. Id. On the issue of state civil injunctions
in federal court, see generally Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The
Last-In-Time Rule For Conflicting Judgments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 798 (1969); Arnold, State
Power To Enjoin Federal Court Proceedings, 51 VA. L. REv. 59 (1965); Note, State Injunctions
of Proceedings in Federal Courts, 75 YALE L.J. 150 (1965).
139. See note 128 supra.
19761
Loyola University Law Journal
CONCLUSION
A state court, relying on the state constitution, is free to grant
broader individual protection than required by the federal constitu-
tion, since the Supreme Court will not review a decision resting on
adequate state grounds. Supreme Court interpretations of the Bill
of Rights should be incorporated by the state supreme court as
foundations for interpreting textually similar state provisions. How-
ever, the state court must recognize its freedom to build upon these
foundations.'40
It is reasonable to presume that many jurisdictions welcome the
recent restrictive Supreme Court opinions. Yet, the Illinois Supreme
Court has indicated that in some aspects of defendants' rights the
Illinois courts may have been leaning in other directions. The Bill
of Rights is a reflection of early state constitutions and until re-
cently it did not apply to the states. Thus, there is no reason for
Illinois to mirror federal law when such conformity is not required.
The problems raised by lack of conformity between the sovereigns
is a problem for the federal courts, and a state supreme court should
not restrict individual protections if logic and good conscience tell
it the law should be otherwise.
BARRY A. SPEVACK
140. One view is that part of the difficulty state courts have in resting on the state
constitution "even where the court apparently meant to do so" in the search and seizure area,
is attributable to the Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) decision extending federal protec-
tion against unreasonable searches to the states. Since Wolf, "all search and seizure cases
came to be classed generically as 'fourth amendment cases' without regard to . . . the state
constitution." Comment, The Scope Of Searches Incident to Traffic Arrests in California:
Rejecting The Federal Rule, 9 U. SAN. FAN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1974).
[Vol. 8
